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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Melonie

Dawn Smith appeals from the district court’s judgment entered after a jury

found Smith guilty of ﬁrst-degree murder and destruction 0f evidence. Smith argues that
the district erred

discretion

When

When

it

it

denied her motion t0 suppress, that the

On

Of The

Facts

February

comments on

Dawn

its

the Video

amounted

to fundamental error.

And Course Of The Proceedings

11,

2017,

Bingham County Sheriff s ofﬁce
Melonie

abused

admitted certain testimony over her obj ection, and that the admission 0f

a Video and the prosecutor’s

Statement

district court

Smith confessed

at

approximately 9:00 p.m.,

Guy Lopez went

to report a murder. (R., p.268.)

to

him

that she shot

He

into the

told the ofﬁcers that

David Davis “in the head with

[a]

45/70 riﬂe containing a red-tipped, armor-piercing bullet” and that Smith contacted Lopez
t0 help

move Davis’s body out of Smith’s home.

murder occurred

of Smith’s home.

home.

(Bettie Duke),

(R., p.270.)

and ‘freaking

(R., p.269.)

hit

by

Lopez

He

Smith attempted

t0 stop the bleeding

out.”’

“Smith told [Lopez] she was so upset by

(R., p.270.)

him

in the

back 0f his head

like

an animal that

a car.” (R., p.270.)

told the ofﬁcers that he

“observed the Victim wrapped in

“observed blood and
that

Kevin Day, shot Davis

“Davis was 0n his knees, grabbing for Smith’s mother

Davis’s screams and bleeding that she shot

had been

According to Smith, the

after another individual, subsequently identiﬁed as

in the legs outside

inside of her

(R., pp.269-70.)

human

had accompanied Smith
99

plastic,

debris dripping

“Smith had made considerable

66

to her

saw brain-matter

down the wall.”

efforts t0 clean

home.

(R., p.271.)

in Smith’s

home,” and

He

also noticed

(R., p.271.)

up the brain matter from the walls” and

had placed “part of the

He

p.271.)

and ‘bones and

skull,

told the ofﬁcers he

had seen

all

stuff” in the

of

this

wood-burning stove.”’

(R.,

“approximately one hour before

contacting the police.” (R., p.271.)

Lopez gave the ofﬁcers the location 0f Smith’s home.
the ofﬁcers diagrams of the outside and inside of Smith’s

“detailed that other guns could be found in the

from the 45/70), was located behind the door.”
a group of ofﬁcers went t0 Smith’s

home.”

(R., p.270.)

home.

(R., p.272.)

also

(R., p.272.)

drew

Lopez

“One weapon (different

(R., p.272.) After receiving

home While a detective

He

Lopez’s report,

simultaneously pursued a search

a warrant. (R., pp.273, 292.)

The ofﬁcers assigned
dark

at

make

to

approximately 11:00 p.m.

home

contact with Smith arrived at Smith’s

(R., p.273.)

after

There were ﬁve vehicles in Smith’s

driveway. (R., p.273.) The ofﬁcers knocked 0n the door, and Smith came out. (R., p.274.)

An

ofﬁcer “explained that the police received a report about ‘something going on’” and

“said that the police wanted t0

come and

responded ‘everything’s ﬁne.”
a report that someone at the

come

inside Smith’s

get a warrant.

home

(R., p.275.)

see if everything

(R., p.275.)

The ofﬁcers explained

home might need medical

t0 check.

(R., p.275.)

attention

(R., p.275.)

that they

and asked

“Smith

had received
if

they could

Smith declined and told the ofﬁcers

t0

Eventually, Smith explained to the ofﬁcers that “Kevin” shot

“David” in the leg in Smith’s driveway and claimed
left

was okay.”

that both

“Kevin” and “David” had

Smith’s property. (R., p.277.) The ofﬁcers indicated that they had information Davis

was dead

inside Smith’s

Smith continued

The ofﬁcers decided

home.

(R., p.277.)

“Smith denied

this information.” (R., p.277.)

t0 insist that the ofﬁcers obtain a search warrant. (R., pp.275-78.)

t0 seize the

house in anticipation of securing a warrant.

(R., p.278.)

“Smith placed both hands 0n either side 0f the door frame and stated that the ofﬁcers could
not enter the

home

Without a warrant.” (R., p.279.) The ofﬁcers put Smith in handcuffs

and removed her from the front deck.

As the

ofﬁcers were putting Smith in handcuffs, Smith’s mother, Duke,

door. (R., p.279.)

The ofﬁcers explained

not go back inside the
inside the

(R., p.279.)

home

the situation t0

Without a police escort.

home, and the ofﬁcers followed her

Duke and told her that

(R., pp.279-80.)

the ofﬁcers repeatedly stated ‘Sheriﬁ’s Ofﬁce,

(R., p.280.)

stated “I smell

it.”

As

the ofﬁcers

(R., p.281.)

laundry room.” (R., p.28 1 .)

he believed t0 be two

removed by the ofﬁcers.”
the

(R.,

come

The ofﬁcers saw
ofﬁcers

(R., p.281.)

While a warrant was obtained.”

Duke went back

out’ as they

(R., p.280.)

walked through the

“[a] large black

felt

the end 0f the

The ofﬁcers

(R., p.281.)

bag 0n the ﬂoor of the

bag and “identiﬁed what

said “the house

would be sealed

“The large bag was not opened, moved, or

p.28 1 .) “Instead, the ofﬁcers articulated their intent to close

home, remove [Duke], and await the execution 0f the search warrant.”

“A search warrant of Smith’s home issued 0n February
ofﬁcers executed the search warrant

p.282.)

at

approximately 3 :00

The ofﬁcers found Davis’s body wrapped

108; Tr., p.713, Ls.14-23.)

p.1114, Ls.8-21;

wood-burning

ﬂ

“One 0f

walked through Smith’s kitchen, one of the ofﬁcers

One 0f the

feet.”

she could

inside. (R., p.280.)

The ofﬁcers walked through the home with their guns drawn.

home.”

came to the

The “head

State’s EX. 220.)

12,

2017.”

(R., p.28

(R., p.282.)

am. on February

12,

in the black plastic bag.

stove. (State’s EXS. 130-32, 134-35;

ﬂ

Tr.,

The

2017. (R.,

(State’s EX.

[had] exploded as a result of [a] gunshot.”

The ofﬁcers found

1 .)

(T12,

parts 0f Davis’s skull in the

p.1069, Ls. 14-20.) The ofﬁcers

numerous guns

also found

black .45-70 riﬂe

The
pp. 140-41

.)

(R., p.159.)

(Tr.,

in the

house (State’s EX. 153;

p.743, Ls.10-13;

ﬂ

Tr.,

p.742, Ls.3-6), including a

State’s EX. 156).

charged Smith with ﬁrst—degree murder and destruction 0f evidence.

state

Smith moved

to suppress the evidence obtained

(R.,

from the search of her home.

Smith only challenged the warrantless entry into her home; she did “not

challenge the probable cause for issuance of the Warrant.” (R., p.298.) The district court

denied Smith’s motion t0 suppress 0n the basis that exigent circumstances supported the
ofﬁcers’ initial entry into the home, including the need to preserve evidence and the need

t0

conduct a protective sweep for ofﬁcer safety.

found

that,

(R., pp.290-94.)

if the ofﬁcers’ entry violated the

even

The

district court also

Fourth Amendment, the inevitable

discovery doctrine precluded suppression because the ofﬁcers inevitably would have
discovered the evidence

At

trial,

search warrant. (R., pp.295-98.)

both sides agreed that Davis had been killed in Smith’s

gunshot t0 the head.

(Tr.,

statement, the jury only

The

When they executed the

state

p.459, Ls.15-21.)

As

had “t0 decide Who did

L.4, p.1348, L.10

— p.1349, L9.)

(Tr., p.

The

a

Smith’s counsel explained in his opening
it.”

put on three different witnesses

Smith said she wanted Davis dead.

home from

(Tr.,

who

1221, L.16

state also

p.460, Ls.1-2.)

testiﬁed that, prior t0 the murder,

— p. 1222,

L.19, p.1340, L.5

— p.1341,

put 0n four different Witnesses

Who

testiﬁed that, after the murder, Smith confessed that she killed Davis. (Tr., p.1317, Ls. 10-

25, p.1369, L.17

— p.1370, L9, p.1489, L.16 — p.1490,

L.5, p.1538, Ls.15-17.)

also introduced the Video of the ofﬁcers’ initial entry into Smith’s

Smith

telling the ofﬁcers that

State’s Exhibit 4.)

Day shot Davis

in the legs

and both

The

state

home, which showed

men left her home.

(E

The

was

in the

state also called

Duke

house When Davis was shot but that she did not see

Ls.15-19, p.1255, Ls.20-21.)

“sounded

She did

testify,

Who

(T12,

shot him. (T12, p.1254,

however, that she heard a “big boom” that

Duke

p.1251, Ls.2-4, p.1255, Ls.22-24.)

murder, she stayed one night

at

also testiﬁed that, after the

a crisis center before her other daughter, Kellie Leslie, and

her grandson, Jeremy Leslie, picked her up to take her to Boise.
p.1275, L.12.)

Duke

testiﬁed that she did not

Leslies and denied (0r at least did not

(T11,

she

gunshot” and that Smith told her that “‘[w]e put the son of a bitch out of

like a

his misery.’”

Duke testiﬁed that

as a witness. (Tr., p.1234, L.17.)

p.1275, L.19

— p.1276,

(Tr.,

p.1274, L.11

remember having a conversation with

remember)

telling the Leslies that

—

the

Smith killed Davis.

L.2.)

After Duke’s testimony, the state called Kellie Leslie and then Jeremy Leslie as
Witnesses.

The prosecutor asked both Witnesses What Duke

told

them on the drive

to

Boise

(TL, p.1295, L.11, p.1303, L.1), and Smith’s counsel asserted a hearsay objection both

times (TL, p.1295, Ls. 12-13, p.1303, Ls.2-3). The district court overruled both objections

without comment. (TL, p.1295, L.14, p.1303, L.4.) Kellie Leslie testiﬁed that
that

Smith shot Davis in the head,

that

said she put Davis out of his misery.

could only remember

(T11,

p.1303, L.1

Day

and shot Davis

(T12,

— p.1297,

p.1295, L.11

Duke talking about someone being

shot and a

plastic,

L.14.)

and

that

said

Smith

Jeremy Leslie

body at Smith’s house.

— p.1305, L20.)

Smith took the stand in her
that, after

Smith wrapped the body in

Duke

own

defense.

(T12,

p.1583, Ls.12-13.) Smith testiﬁed

shot Davis in the legs and left in his car,

in the head.

Smith also explained

that,

(TL, p.1612, L.3

when

Day came back t0

— p.1617,

the ofﬁcers ﬁrst

came

L.15.)

On

Smith’s house

direct examination,

t0 her house, she did not let the

ofﬁcers search her house because she “was afraid that they’d not handle the evidence
correctly” and she “had

paraphernalia.”

that

Smith had

that

Davis had

some concerns about

(TL, p.1625, Ls.10-16.)
lied to the police

left

when

mom’s weed

[her]

pipes and

some drug

In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued

they ﬁrst arrived

her house after being shot.

(Tr.,

at

her

home when

p.1722, Ls.1-7.)

she told them

As

part of that

argument, he also commented that Smith wanted the ofﬁcers “to leave and g0 about their
business

.

.

.

because she had something to hide.” (TL, p.1722, Ls.6-10.)

The jury found Smith
(R., pp.520-21.)

(R., p.570.)

The

guilty 0f ﬁrst—degree

district court

murder and destruction of evidence.

sentenced Smith t0 an aggregate sentence 0f ﬁxed

Smith timely appealed.

(R., pp.575-77.)

life.

ISSUES
Smith

states the issues

Whether the

I.

t0 suppress

on appeal

as:

district court erred

When

it

denied Ms. Smith’s motion

because the exigent circumstances and protective sweep

exceptions do not justify the warrantless search 0f her house after

ofﬁcers froze the scene, and the inevitable discovery doctrine does
not prevent the suppression of the evidence gained from that

unlawful search.

Whether the

II.

district court

abused

Leslies’ hearsay testimony to

discretion

its

by allowing

the

be admitted for the truth 0f the matter

asserted.

Whether several of Ms. Smith’s

III.

fundamental

error,

When

rights

were violated, amounting

to

a Video showing her repeatedly refusing t0

consent to a search 0f her house was admitted at

trial

and the

prosecutor argued the jurors should infer guilt based 0n those
refusals.

Whether, even

above preserved errors are individually
Amendment right to due process
0f law was violated because the accumulation of errors deprived her
0f her right to a fair trial.

IV.

if the

harmless, Ms. Smith’s Fourteenth

(Appellant’s brief, p.1

The

1.)

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Smith

show

failed to

the district court erred

when

it

denied her motion to

suppress?

II.

Has Smith

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

when

it

overruled Smith’s hearsay objections to the Leslies’ testimony?

III.

Has Smith

show

failed t0

the admission of State’s Exhibit 4 rose to the level of

fundamental error?
IV.

Has Smith

failed to

show

the prosecutor’s

comment

in his closing

argument

rose to the level of fundamental error?

Has Smith

failed to

show that the cumulative

error doctrine applies to her case?

ARGUMENT
I.

The
A.

District Court Properly

Denied Smith’s Motion T0 Suppress

Introduction

The

district court

from her home

properly denied Smith’s motion t0 suppress the evidence seized

for three reasons:

First, the

ofﬁcers’ reasonable fear of the imminent

destruction of evidence justiﬁed the warrantless entry.

Lopez

told the ofﬁcers that Smith

confessed t0 murdering Davis and that Smith was in the process of cleaning up the murder
scene at her home.

Second, the ofﬁcers’ reasonable, articulable suspicion that a dangerous individual

was

in the

in her

home justiﬁed

a protective sweep.

The ofﬁcers knew Smith had multiple guns

home, the home was dark, and there were ﬁve

cars in Smith’s

driveway even though

only Smith and her mother lived there.
Third, the inevitable discovery doctrine precluded suppression 0f the evidence.

Where, as here, the ofﬁcers obtained and executed a search warrant, the proper inquiry
under the inevitable discovery doctrine

is

whether probable cause existed to support the

search warrant after excising any unlawfully obtained information. Smith did not challenge
the search warrant in the district court and,

0n appeal, does not challenge the

district court’s

correct conclusion that such probable cause existed.

B.

Standard

“When

Of Review

this

Court reviews a

district court’s

suppress evidence, the standard ofreview

405, 247 P.3d 631, 632 (201

1).

is

order granting or denying a motion to

bifurcated.” State V. Skurlock, 150 Idaho 404,

“The Court

Will accept the trial court’s

ﬁndings 0f

fact

unless they are clearly erroneous, but

may

freely review the trial court’s application of

constitutional principles in light of the facts found.”

C.

I_d.

The Fourth Amendment Did Not Require Suppression Of The Evidence Seized
From Smith’s Home
The

district court

Amendment,

a person

properly denied Smith’s motion to suppress. “Under the Fourth
assured ‘not that n0 government search 0f his house Will occur

is

unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that

unreasonable.”

is

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 220, 984 P.2d 703, 708 (1999) (quoting
U.S. 177, 183 (1990)). The
to preserve evidence

and

to

initial

entry into Smith’s

home was

Illinois V.

State V.

Rodriguez, 497

reasonable given the need

conduct a protective sweep for ofﬁcer safety. Even

if

those

exceptions t0 the warrant requirement did not apply, the district court properly denied the

motion

t0 suppress

under the inevitable discovery doctrine.

The Need T0 Preserve Evidence Justiﬁed The Entry

1.

The

risk

Into Smith’s

0f the destruction of evidence justiﬁed the ofﬁcers”

initial

Home

entry into

Smith’s home. “[T]he need to prevent the imminent destruction 0f evidence has long been

recognized as a sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for a warrantless search.” Kentucky
U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).

they appeared

at the precise

moment

King, 563

“In determining whether the ofﬁcers

reasonably feared imminent destruction 0f evidence, the appropriate inquiry
facts, as

V.

in question,

is

whether the

would lead a reasonable,

experienced ofﬁcer t0 believe that evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be
secured.” State V. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999).

Here, the facts found by the district court pass that

test.

Lopez

told the police “that

he had just come from Smith’s home” Where he saw evidence 0f a murder, including the
Victim’s

body wrapped

in plastic

and brain-matter, blood, and human debris “dripping

down

the wall.” (R., p.271.)

He

explained that he had gone t0 Smith’s house in the ﬁrst

place because Smith wanted help t0 destroy the evidence (R., p.270), and that Smith had

already started doing just that

by exerting “considerable

from the walls”

Lopez

(R., p.271).

efforts to clean

also told police that, just one hour before contacting

wood-buming

stove.”

Any reasonable ofﬁcer confronted With those facts would “believe that

[more]

the police, he “Viewed part 0f the skull, and ‘bones and stuff’ in the

(R., p.271.)

up the brain matter

evidence might be destroyed before a warrant could be secured.”
504, 975 P.2d at 792. Indeed,

it is

difﬁcult t0 imagine a

more

apt

m,

132 Idaho

example of “the imminent

destruction 0f evidence” than an alleged murderer “actively attempting to burn parts or

wood

0f the Victim’s body in her

at

all

stove and to clean the blood and brain material from the

walls and ﬁlmiture.” (R., p.290.)

Smith argues

that the

exigency ended once the police had her detained and their

eyes on Duke. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.) But the police had at least three reasons to
continue fearing the imminent destruction of evidence:

First, as the district court

found,

“the ofﬁcers had reason t0 believe that other persons besides [Duke] might be in the house.”

(R., p.293.)

ofﬁcers

There were “[ﬂive vehicles parked in Smith’s driveway”

knew

that

Smith had already recruited

at least

(R., p.293),

one other individual to help destroy

the evidence (R., p.270). Thus, the exigency did not end at least until the ofﬁcers

that

no one

else

was

in the

home

and the

trying to destroy the evidence.

E

conﬁrmed

State V. Fees, 140

Idaho 81, 85-87, 90 P.3d 306, 3 10-12 (2004) (holding the destruction-of—evidence exigency
allows ofﬁcers t0 enter the

home and

“secure the premises”).

Second, Smith did not need t0 be present to destroy the evidence.

knew

that

Smith had placed

at least “part

of the

10

skull,

and ‘bones and

The ofﬁcers

stuff’ in the

wood-

burning stove.” (R., p.27 1 .)

If,

for example,

Smith started a ﬁre in the stove immediately

prior t0 answering the door, the evidence could have

been destroyed Without any further

action from Smith. Thus, the exigency did not end at least until the ofﬁcers ruled out the

ongoing destruction 0f evidence.
Third, simply being able t0 see

evidence.

all

Duke would

Duke “turned away from the ofﬁcers and re-entered the home.”

the ofﬁcers

knew, Duke was 0n her way

other action that

would

requirement of the Fourth

result in the

t0 wait at the

t0 start the

(R., p.280.)

For

wood-burning stove or take some

The reasonableness

destruction of evidence.

Amendment did not require the ofﬁcers to wait and ﬁnd out.

State V. Kofoed, 147 Idaho 296, 299,

E

208 P.3d 278, 281 (2009) (“The police do not have

door in order t0 give the suspect time t0 destroy some of the evidence”).

Contrary to Smith’s argument,

Illinois V.

McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), actually

supports the conclusion that the ofﬁcers could

McArthur, an ofﬁcer stayed With McArthur
ofﬁcer obtained a warrant.
the trailer

not prevent her from destroying

Li

two 0r three times

.

at 329.

.

.

observe What [McArthur] did.”

at

into the

home.

In

McArthur’s home While a second police

While awaiting the warrant, McArthur “reentered

and each time
Li.

accompany Duke

[the ofﬁcer] stood just inside the

The Supreme Court found

door to

the ofﬁcer’s conduct

reasonable, in part, because the ofﬁcer “neither searched the trailer nor arrested

McArthur

before obtaining a warrant” but instead “imposed signiﬁcantly less restrictive restraint,

preventing McArthur onlyfrom entering the trailer unaccompanied.”
added). That

is

I_d.

at

332 (emphasis

exactly What the ofﬁcers here did: “prevent[ed] [Duke] only from entering

the [home] unaccompanied.”

I_d.

11

While the ofﬁcer
limited intrusion here

McArthur limited

his intrusion to just inside the door, such a

would not have adequately addressed

mQ

destroy evidence.

light

in

at

331 (emphasizing the ofﬁcer’s conduct was reasonable “in

of the following circumstances”).

destruction 0f evidence

was

Duke might

the concern that

In McArthur, the ofﬁcer’s concern for the

limited t0 a single bag 0f drugs a Witness

had

just seen the

defendant slide underneath the couch, so the ofﬁcer could easily prevent the defendant

from tampering with the drugs
at 329.

if the

defendant started reaching under the couch.

EQ

Here, 0n the other hand, the ofﬁcers were concerned about a signiﬁcant amount of

evidence, including a body, blood, brain matter, bones, and part of a skull, and the ofﬁcers

could not be sure of the evidence’s location in the house because their information was
least

two hours

Moreover, Smith’s house was dark and

(R., pp.268, 273.)

01d.

so the ofﬁcers could have had difﬁculty seeing What

Duke was

doing.

(Lg,

at

cluttered,

State’s EX.

4

at 9:40-10:00.)

Smith argues

imminent

that “the ofﬁcers

had no basis

threat to the evidence believe[d] t0

far as the ofﬁcers

t0 believe

be inside.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.15.) But, as

knew, Duke saw Smith commit the murder two days prior

Duke had made n0

effort t0 report the

murder, and Duke

even When the ofﬁcers showed up 0n her front porch
reasonably infer from those facts that

Duke was

could be Willing t0 destroy evidence t0 d0

protecting Smith, her

The ofﬁcers could

own

daughter, and

so.

.

.

.

house while she was standing in the doorway.” (Appellant’s
the decision in Duke’ s hands

(R., p.270),

made no mention of the murder

(R., pp.274-80).

Smith also argues that “the ofﬁcers could have

left

Ms. Duke presented an

removed Ms. Duke from the
brief, p.15.)

by warning her multiple times

12

that if she

But the ofﬁcers

went back inside

the house the ofﬁcers

Duke

“turned

would have

t0 escort her.

(R., pp.279-80.)

away from the ofﬁcers and re-entered the home.”

Despite those warnings,

(R., p.280.)

Furthermore,

Smith’s post-hoc suggestion that the ofﬁcers had a better option to address the exigency

does not transform the ofﬁcers’ reasonable solution to the exigency into a Fourth

ﬂ

Amendment Violation.
embody allowance

K_ing,

563 U.S.

at

466 (“[T]he calculus ofreasonableness must

for the fact that police ofﬁcers are forced to

judgments—in circumstances

that are tense, uncertain,

make

split—second

and rapidly evolving.”

(internal

quotes omitted»; State V. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 486, 163 P.3d 1194, 1198 (2007) (“So

long as the claim 0f exigency

0f ofﬁcials

who

Duke decided

is

not a pretext, courts avoid second-guessing the decisions

reasonably believe they are confronting an urgent situation”).

to re-enter the

home, the exigency did not end

home. Thus, because the ofﬁcers had an ongoing
time they entered Smith’s home, the

initial

at least until

Because

Duke

left

the

fear 0f the destruction of evidence at the

entry into Smith’s

home

did not Violate the

Fourth Amendment.

The Protective Sweep Exception Justiﬁed The Entry

2.

The

sweep exception

protective

Who

arrest

an individual

at

Home

to the warrant requirement also justiﬁed the

ofﬁcers’ initial entry into Smith’s home.

ofﬁcers

Into Smith’s

As an exception

home can “conduct

a protective sweep of the premises

provided that they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion

an individual posing a danger to those on the

to the warrant requirement,

arrest scene.

‘that the area to
’”

State V.

be swept harbors

Revenaugh, 133 Idaho

774, 776, 992 P.2d 769, 771 (1999) (quoting Maryland V. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)).

The

protective

formally arrested

sweep exception applies even

at the

if the suspect is

“detained rather than

time the protective sweep occurred” and regardless of Whether the

13

defendant was detained inside or outside of the home. Li.

777, 992 P.2d at 772.

at

example, in Revenaugh, an ofﬁcer responded t0 a malicious injury to property
bullet holes in a building.

bullet holes to

Li. at 775,

Revenaugh’s home.

992 P.2d

Li.

As

He

at 770.

the ofﬁcer approached he

in

saw Revenaugh and

some

smelled the strong odor 0f marijuana.

Li.

Revenaugh and

the other

house When they saw the ofﬁcer but came back out

The ofﬁcer summoned other ofﬁcers
protective

sweep 0f the home.

activity

around two

and one small clear baggie” and “observed one 0f the

holding a green stalk and apparently trimming leaves from that stalk.”

into the

call for four

followed the trajectory of the

two other individuals standing outside of the home “engaged
large black plastic garbage bags,

for assistance and,

For

at the

upon

men

Li The ofﬁcer also
two individuals ran

ofﬁcer’s request.

their arrival,

Li.

conducted a

Li.

The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately held
justiﬁed the warrantless entry.

First, the court

that the protective

sweep exception

held that the protective sweep exception

only required some kind of “custodial situation” and not a formal arrest because “any
distinction

between a ‘detention’ and a formal

ofﬁcer safety.

Li. at 777,

992 P.2d

at 772.

arrest

.

.

.

is

negligible” for purposes 0f

Second, the court held “that the ‘protective

sweep” exception to the warrant requirement applies when the suspect

is

arrested/detained

outside the residence” because “[a] bullet ﬁred at an arresting ofﬁcer standing outside a

window
P.2d

at

is

as deadly as

one that

is

773 (quoting United States

the court held that the ofﬁcer

person was

still

projected from one

V.

to another.”

Hovos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1397 (9th

had a reasonable,

inside the house. Li.

room

at

778, 992

Cir. 1989)). Third,

articulable suspicion that a dangerous

The court reasoned

that,

while the ofﬁcer

have had absolute proof that someone else was inside the residence,

14

I_d.

[he]

“may not
set forth

articulable facts,

someone

else

based on his knowledge and experience which led him to believe that

might be in the house.”

I_d.

Speciﬁcally, the court relied

on the ofﬁcer’s

testimony that he could not see into the house, that Revenaugh had retreated into the house,
that the ofﬁcer

was apparently dealing with a marijuana operation which,

in his training

and experience, often involved paranoid people and quite a few weapons, and

that

he had

been in the process of investigating apparent bullet holes in the neighboring business.

Revenaugh
like

is

dispositive of the protective

Revenaugh, was in a “custodial

situation.”

sweep issue

Li. at 777,

in this case.

992 P.2d

First,

at 772.

I_d.

Smith,

The ofﬁcers

confronted Smith at her front door, placed Smith in handcuffs, removed her from the front
deck, and placed her in a police car. (R., p.279; Tr., p.59, Ls.1-6.)

Second, Smith, like Revenaugh, was detained immediately outside of the residence.

The ofﬁcers detained Smith after she stood in the doorway and “placed both hands 0n either
side 0f the door frame” trying to prevent the ofﬁcers

Third, if the ofﬁcer in

had those

“could not see into the house.” 133 Idaho

at

articulable facts to justify a

facts in spades.

The ofﬁcer

in

Revenaugh

778, 992 P.2d at 773. Here, “the house

black” inside

(T12, p.59,

p.86, Ls.2-4),

and the area around the house was

1).

entering. (R., p.279.)

Revenaugh had sufﬁcient

protective sweep, the ofﬁcers here

L.

from

was

Ls.20-24), the ofﬁcers approached in the darkness 0f night (TL,
“all

blacked out” (TL, p.50, L.16 — p.5 1,

The ofﬁcer in Revenaugh thought there might be a weapon

in the

house only because

“he was apparently dealing With a marijuana operation Which, in his training and
experience, often involved paranoid people and ‘quite a few weapons,’ and

.

.

.

he had

been in the process of investigating apparent bullet holes in the neighboring business.” 133
Idaho

at

778, 992 P.2d at 773. Here, an eye-Witness “detailed” the multiple guns in Smith’s

15

home, including a gun located behind the

front door. (R., p.272.)

The ofﬁcer in Revenaugh

“had no indication that someone else was in the residence.” 133 Idaho
773. Here, however, there were

ﬁve

cars parked in the

very concerning” to the ofﬁcers because
just

Smith and Duke (TL, p.97, Ls.1 1-21

knew
left

that

;

it

driveway

778, 992 P.2d at

(R., p.273),

which “was

meant there could be more people inside than

ﬂ

Tr., p.61, Ls.9-19).

Furthermore, the ofﬁcers

Smith had already recruited Lopez t0 help destroy evidence and, since Lopez

without helping, the ofﬁcers had reason to believe Smith

else.

at

(Tr., p.73,

L.22 — p.74, L.5.)

may have recruited someone
had greater safety

Finally, the ofﬁcers in this case

concerns than the ofﬁcer in Revenaugh arising from the crime being investigated:

Revenaugh, the ofﬁcer went to the home
in a building.

133 Idaho

at

after receiving a report

In

ofvandalism—bullet holes

Here, ofﬁcers reported t0 Smith’s

775, 992 P.2d at 770.

residence in response t0 a report 0f two serious crimes 0f Violence—Day shooting Davis

in the legs

and Smith shooting Davis in the head.

Thus, the ofﬁcers here,

(R., pp.269-70.)

even more so than the ofﬁcer in Revenaugh, had reasonable, articulable suspicion that
justiﬁed a protective sweep.

Smith argues the number of cars did not matter because “Mr. Lopez told the ofﬁcers

Ms. Smith kept multiple vehicles

Lopez

told the ofﬁcers that Smith

in the driveway.”

hadfour

(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.)

cars parked outside her

6 at 4:25-4:55), and the ofﬁcers foundﬁve cars at the
the ﬁfth car gave the ofﬁcers reason t0 believe that

house since the time Lopez had

left

home

house (Supp. Hr’g EX.

(R., p.273).

someone

else

But

At the very

had arrived

at

least,

Smith’s

Smith’s house.

Smith also argues the number 0f cars did not matter because “people in rural areas
often

own

multiple vehicles.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.)

16

But

that generalization

ignores the speciﬁc facts of this case:

lived at the

home

yet there

Even assuming,

wereﬁve

Lopez

told the ofﬁcers that only

cars parked outside the

as Smith’s citation t0

academic

Smith and Duke

home.

literature suggests, the ofﬁcers

should have conducted an academic inquiry into the average number of cars owned by

people in rural areas before conducting a protective sweep for ofﬁcer safety,

563 U.S.

at

466 (“[T]he calculus 0f reasonableness must embody allowance

that police ofﬁcers are forced to

tense, uncertain,

make

split-second

about 2.90.”’

for the fact

judgments—in circumstances

that are

number ofvehicles owned by all rural households

in Vehicle

0f the Transp. Res. Bd., No. 1926, 2005,

outside Smith’s

K_ing,

(Appellant’s brief, p.17 n.3 (quoting Piyushimita (Vonu) Thakuriah

Yihua Liao, Analysis 0f Variations
J.

ﬂ

and rapidly evolving”), the ofﬁcers would have found, as Smith’s

appellate counsel did, that “[t]he average

is

b_ut

home

would have given

&

Ownership Expenditures, Transp. Res. Rec.:

at 7).)

Given that the number ofvehicles parked

nearly doubled the average for rural areas, the academic literature

the ofﬁcers one

Smith also observes

more reason

that “ofﬁcers

conduct a protective sweep.

t0

had been surveilling the scene prior

to the

detention of Ms. Smith, and did not report anyone coming 0r going during that time.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.17.) But the ofﬁcer in the Video indicates that the surveillance team

was “going out
Hr’g EX. 2
hour

t0 surround” Smith’s

at 19:00-19:05),

after leaving Smith’s

home

after the initial interview with

Lopez (Supp.

and Lopez did not contact the police for approximately one

home

home between Lopez

(R., p.271).

That

leaving Smith’s

left

plenty of time for someone t0 arrive

home and

at

Smith’s

at

Smith’s home. Because the ofﬁcers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that someone

17

the surveillance

team arriving

else

was

home

in the

that

posed a danger, the protective sweep did not Violate the Fourth

Amendment.
The

3.

Even

home

if the

Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Precluded Suppression

ofﬁcers violated the Fourth

Amendment when

they entered Smith’s

Without a warrant, the inevitable discovery doctrine precluded suppression of the

evidence obtained

When

the ofﬁcers executed the search warrant.

Under the doctrine of

inevitable discovery, the exclusionary rule does not apply t0 evidence initially discovered

unlawfully

if

it

inevitably

would have been discovered by lawful means.

Stuart V. State,

136 Idaho 490, 494-97, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283-85 (2001). “Application ofthe

.

.

.

inevitable

discovery doctrine[] to a search warrant containing unlawfully obtained information
requires that the improperly obtained information be disregarded, and a determination be

made

as to whether sufﬁcient untainted information remains t0 provide probable cause.”

State V. Davis, 159 Idaho 491, 494,

133 Idaho

at

362 P.3d 1087, 1090

(Ct.

App. 2015); see Revenaugh,

780, 992 P.2d at 775 (“In determining the validity 0f a search warrant

Whose

underlying application contains illegally obtained information, the ultimate question

whether
is

‘the

is

remaining information presented t0 the magistrate, after the tainted evidence

excluded, contains adequate facts from Which the magistrate could have concluded that

probable cause existed for the issues 0f the search warrant”)
Here, Smith effectively conceded that the information obtained independent from
the ofﬁcers” entry into Smith’s

warrant in the

home provided

district court (R.,

probable cause by failing to challenge the

p.292 (“Smith does not contest the probable cause

underlying the search warrant”); R., p.298 (“Indeed, Smith does not challenge the probable
cause for issuance of the Warrant.”)) and by failing t0 challenge the

18

district court’s

conclusion as to that issue on appeal (Compare R., p.296 (“Disregarding any evidence

gained after the ofﬁcers’ entry into Smith’s home, the Warrant
probable cause”),

ﬂ

that

wisdom of that

concession:

Smith confessed “she grabbed a handgun and put

it

to the

home.” (Supp. Hr’g EX. 10

home and

at 2.)

Lopez

upon

“did see a

Lopez

told the ofﬁcers

back of David Davis’ head

and pulled the trigger” inside 0f her home. (Supp. Hr’g EX. 10
ofﬁcers that he went to Smith’s

validly based

A review of the information in the

Appellant’s brief, pp.17—19).)

search warrant afﬁdavit conﬁrms the

is

Lopez

at 2-3.)

body wrapped

told the

in plastic inside the

told the ofﬁcers that he also

saw “residue of

blood” on the walls and “brain matter, a skull cap and other bone fragments” in a ﬁreplace.
(Supp. Hr’g EX. 10 at 2.) Lopez’s information, standing alone, provided probable cause t0
believe evidence 0f a murder

would be found

in Smith’s

home.

Rather than challenge that conclusion, Smith argues that the inevitable discovery
doctrine cannot apply because the ofﬁcers “included details gleaned from the unlawful

entry in the search warrant application.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.17-19.)

Curiously, she

primarily relies on State V. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 407 P.3d 1285 (2017), a case in Which

ofﬁcers never obtained a search warrant. (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-19.)
the Idaho

Idaho

at

Supreme Court has squarely

rejected Smith’s argument,

More

ﬂ

to the point,

Revenaugh, 133

779, 992 P.2d at 774 (rejecting argument “requir[ing] the suppression of the

evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant because illegally obtained information

was included

in the application for the warrant”),

and the Idaho Court of Appeals has

expressly instructed district courts t0 use the test the district court used here
the inevitable discovery doctrine to a search warrant,

at

1090.

Because the

district court

ﬂ

Da_Vis,

159 Idaho

applied the correct analysis,

19

ﬂ

When applying

at

494, 362 P.3d

Davis, 159 Idaho at

494, 362 P.2d

at

1090, and Smith failed t0 challenge the district court’s conclusion that

probable cause existed even Without the information gathered from the allegedly unlawﬁll
(Appellant’s

entries

brief,

the

pp.17-19),

inevitable

discovery

doctrine

precludes

application of the exclusionary rule in this case.

II.

The

District

Court Did Not Abuse

Discretion

Its

BV Overruling

Smith’s Hearsay

Objections

A.

Introduction

The
testimony.

asserted.

district court

A

properly overruled Smith’s hearsay objections to the Leslies’

statement can only be hearsay if

it is

offered for the truth of the matter

Here, as Smith concedes, the prosecutor introduced Duke’s statements through

impeach Duke. Because the statements were offered

the Leslies t0

to

impeach Duke rather

than for the truth of the matter asserted, the district court correctly overruled Smith’s

hearsay obj ections.

Even
harmless.

if the district court erred

Duke’s statements

that

came

duplicative 0f Duke’s statements that

testimony and
Smith’s

guilt,

trial

by admitting

the Leslies’ testimony, the error

were largely

in through the Leslies’ testimony

came

in at trial through

was

Duke’s preliminary hearing

testimony. Furthermore, the state presented overwhelming evidence 0f

including multiple Witnesses

Who testiﬁed that Smith confessed to murdering

Davis.

B.

Standard

“The

trial

Will be reversed

Of Review
court has broad discretion in the admission 0f evidence, and

0n appeal only when there has been an abuse of discretion.”

131 Idaho 22, 34, 951 P.2d 1249, 1261 (1997).

20

its

judgment

State V. Bush,

C.

And Jeremy Leslie’s Testimony Was Not Hearsay

Kellie Leslie’s

The

did not abuse

district court

discretion

its

When

it

overruled Smith’s hearsay

objections to Kellie Leslie’s and Jeremy Leslie’s testimony.

inadmissible absent an applicable exception.

I.R.E. 802.

The

Hearsay

rules

is

generally

deﬁne hearsay

as an

out 0f court statement that a party “offer[s] in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.”

I.R.E. 801(c) (2017).

Prior inconsistent statements used t0 impeach a Witness

“are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of any facts asserted, but rather,

solely t0

impeach the

credibility

of the Witness.” State

V.

Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 103, 334

P.3d 280, 294 (2014) (internal quotes omitted).
Here, the district court properly overruled Smith’s hearsay obj ections to the Leslies’
testimony.

As Smith concedes,

the prosecutor introduced the testimony t0

impeach Duke:

“The prosecutor then presented testimony from both Kellie and Jeremy Leslie

Ms. Duke’s

denials.” (Appellant’s brief, p.21.)

to contradict

Smith’s counsel objected t0 Kellie’s and

Jeremy’s testimony solely 0n the basis that Duke’s statements were hearsay. (TL, p.1295,
Ls. 12-13, p. 1 303, Ls.2-3.)

The

properly overruled Smith’s hearsay obj ections

district court

because Duke’s statements were offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but to

impeach Duke and were thus—by deﬁnition—not hearsay.
Idaho

at 103,

334 P.3d

at

wanted the jury

it

I.R.E. 801(0);

KLch, 157

294.

Smith argues on appeal
purpose for Which

ﬂ

that the district court

admitted the evidence.

had some obligation

(Appellant’s brief, pp.20-22.) But if Smith

t0 consider the evidence only for a limited purpose,

but did not—request a limiting instruction:

to limit the

“When evidence which is

Smith could

have—

admissible as t0 one

party or for one purpose but not admissible as t0 another party or for another purpose
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is

admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to

the jury accordingly.”

its

proper scope and instruct

The

I.R.E. 105 (2017) (emphasis added).

district court

had n0

obligation t0 instruct the jury sua sponte 0n the limited purpose 0f the admitted evidence.

E

State V.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (ﬁnding no error where

district court failed t0

because “there

is

give limiting instruction

When

admitting impeachment evidence

nothing in [Rule 105] that requires the giving of a limiting instruction

absent a request from [the defendant]”).1

Even
require a

if the district court erred in overruling

new

error, the State

trial

because they were harmless.

Smith’s objections, the errors do not

E

I.C.R. 52.

must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

contribute t0 the verdict obtained.’”

814 (2014) (quoting State
other words, the error

Without the error.”

is

V. Per_ry,

harmless

State V.

“T0

error

establish harmless

complained 0f did not

State V. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140,

334 P.3d 806,

150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). “‘In
if the

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d

38,

44 (2017)

(quoting State V. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)).

Any

error in admitting Kellie’s

was harmless because

the testimony

and Jeremy’s testimony about Duke’s statements

was

duplicative of properly admitted evidence.

State V. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055,

1

Smith also claims

that,

E

1059 (2003) (holding erroneous

in closing argument, the prosecutor “argue[d] the Leslies’

testimony for the truth 0f the matters asserted therein.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.22.)

But the

prosecutor’s closing argument could not retroactively affect the district court’s evidentiary
rulings. If

Smith thought the prosecutor went outside the admitted evidence in his closing

argument, she could have lodged a contemporaneous obj ection
the issue under fundamental error review

on appeal.

E

very least, raised
Perry, 150 Idaho 209,

or, at the

State V.

227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010). Smith did neither; she has waived the issue.

Murray V.

State,

156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014).
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m

admission 0f report harmless because “[t]he report was a duplicate of testimony under
oath”); Leliefeld V. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 369-70,

659 P.2d 111, 123-24 (1983) (holding

erroneous admission 0f evidence harmless because

On

admissible and admitted evidence”).
statements: “that

Duke had
said that

said

‘she put

in plastic;

0n three 0f Duke’s
in the head; that

and

that

Ms.

Ms. Duke had

them out 0f his misery.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.21

Those statements were largely duplicative of admitted evidence.

remember

said she did not

misery, the prosecutor impeached

Duke

appeal, Smith focuses

Ms. Smith wrapped Mr. DaVis’ body up

Ms. Smith had said

Duke

“was largely duplicative 0f

Ms. Duke had said Ms. Smith had shot Mr. Davis

(citations omitted).)

After

it

Smith said she put Davis out 0f his

testifying that

Duke using her preliminary hearing testimony in which

testiﬁed that, shortly after she heard a loud bang, Smith “said ‘[W]e put the son 0f a

bitch out ofhis misery.” (TL, p. 1252, L.20

at trial,

Duke

testiﬁed, without objection, that

ofhis misery.”

(T12,

When Duke

L.2.) In fact, later in her testimony

Smith said “‘[w]e put the son of a bitch out

p.1255, Ls.22-24.)

testiﬁed that her dog, rather than Smith, rustled With plastic after the

murder, the prosecutor impeached

Duke with

Duke testiﬁed she could hear “[Smith]
p.1254, L.20

— p. 1253,

— p.1255,

L.5.)

her preliminary hearing testimony in which

rustling with the plastic” after

Davis was

shot. (T12,

Those impeachments 0f Duke With her preliminary hearing

testimony came in for the truth of the matter asserted because the testimony was “given

under oath and subject t0 the penalty of perjury
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) (2017);

Any
was

ﬂ

at

a

trial,

hearing, 0r other proceeding.”

State V. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 74,

error in admitting Kellie’s

253 P.3d 727 (201

1).

and Jeremy’s testimony about Duke’s statements

also harmless because the state presented
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overwhelming evidence of Smith’s

guilt.

E

Montgomery, 163 Idaho

at 46,

408 P.3d

at

44 (holding error harmless “[b]ased on the

overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery
at trial

was who pulled the

trigger.

at trial”).

The only contested

(m TL, p.459, L.15 — p.460, L.2.)

Multiple Witnesses

testiﬁed that, before the murder, Smith said she wanted Davis dead:

Robert

testiﬁed that “[m]any times throughout [their] friendship” Smith had told

wanted

t0 kill [Davis]” because

Davis had stolen from

because Davis took Smith’s Jeep and never paid for
Michelle Bennett testiﬁed

said that “‘[t]here’s one in the

never paid for

it.

that, after

chamber

(TL, p.1221, L.16

Davis:

p.1348, L.10

— p.1341,

kill

[Davis]”

— p.1349,

L.9.)

bringing a riﬂe out of Smith’s bedroom, Smith

for DaViS’” because Davis took Smith’s Jeep

— p.1222,

Multiple Witnesses also testiﬁed

(Tr.,

it.

Magoon
that “she

him

(TL, p.1340, L.5

Robert Christianson testiﬁed that Smith told him “she was going t0

L.4.)

And

her.

issue

and

L.19.)

that, after the

murder, Smith confessed t0 killing

Guy Lopez testiﬁed that Smith called him looking for help and picked him up from

his daughter’s house. (Tr., p.1538, Ls.7-14.) In the car

0n the way back

t0 Smith’s

home,

she told Lopez that “she had shot David Davis and killed him” and that she “blew his

fucking head 0f

.”

(TL, p.1538, L.15

— p.1539,

L.7.)

She explained

shot Davis in the legs s0 she decided t0 “put[] an animal

anyway.” (TL, p.1539, L.8 — p.1540,

L.2.)

She told Lopez

down

that she

armor piercing round. (TL, p.1540, Ls.3-5.) Lopez told the jury

him inside her house he saw Davis’s body in Smith’s kitchen 0n

that

that

Kevin Day had

was going

t0 die

used a .45-70 With an

that

when Smith brought

a piece 0f plastic and “the

top of the head and brains and stuff that she had cleaned up off of the wall and put in the
fireplace.” (TL, p.1541, L.11

— p.1543,

L.3.)
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Kelly Black testiﬁed that Smith came to his house and told him that “she shot
[Davis] in the head” With a .45-70 and “[s]he wanted everybody t0 go help her clean the

mess up.” (TL, p.1370, Ls.2-24, p.1372, L.22 — p.1373,

L.4.)

Kevin Day testiﬁed

that

Smith called him shortly after Day had shot Davis in the legs and told him that “she ﬁnished

What [Day]

started”

and

that

Davis “doesn’t have a head.” (TL, p.1489, L.16 — p.1490,

L.5.)

And

Carlos Gonzalez testiﬁed that Smith told

body”

that

was

in “[h]er

him “she needed help cleaning up a

house” because “[s]he had shot somebody.” (TL, p.13 17, Ls. 10-

25.)

Consistent With

all

of that testimony, ofﬁcers found Davis’s body in Smith’s home.

(State’s EX. 108; Tr., p.713, Ls.14-23.)

EX. 228;

Tr., p.1 129, Ls.5-17),

The top half of Davis’s head was missing

and an FBI expert testiﬁed that

skull fragments

(State’s

found in the

wood-burning stove matched Davis’s body (TL, p.1069, Ls.14-20). Ofﬁcers also found a
.45-70 riﬂe in Smith’s home. (Tr., p.743, Ls.10-13;

When

ﬂ

State’s EX. 156.)

faced with this overwhelming evidence, Smith decided t0 take the stand but

ended up doing more harm than good. The version of the murder Smith told
inconsistent with

after shooting

told.

Smith testiﬁed

was

at trial that,

Davis in the legs and leaving Smith’s home, Kevin Day returned t0 the house

and shot Davis

in the

when the police
legs both

two other versions Smith had already

at trial

ﬁrst

head and thenjust “laughed.” (TL, p.1617, L.7 — p.1618, L.16.) But

came

Day and Davis

t0 Smith’s

left

home, she told them

that after

Day shot Davis

her house. (State’s EX. 4 at 2:35-3:00.)
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in the

And Smith told her

boyfriend, in a recorded jail telephone call played to the jury, that

mother,

Who “blew
The

case.

story

[Davis’s] fucking head off,

Smith told

For example, Smith testiﬁed

started the conversation

6.)

was

the

also inconsistent With the other evidence in the

that,

t0 the jury

When the prosecutor confronted

was Duke, her own

way off.”2

when

the ofﬁcers ﬁrst

by asking whether Kevin Day was

But the Video presented

0:30.)

at trial

all

it

showed no such
Smith with

came

to her house, she

in custody. (Tr., p.1634, Ls.2-

question.

(State’s EX.

4

at 0:00-

this inconsistency, she insisted that the

Video started recording after she had asked the question. (TL, p.1665, L.8 — p.1666, L.1.)

Smith presumably did not

however, that a second Video admitted into evidence

realize,

recorded the ofﬁcers approaching the house in their cars, the ofﬁcers knocking on Smith’s
front door,

and the

entire conversation

between Smith and the ofﬁcers.

(ﬂ State’s EX.

7;

TL, p.527, L.20 — p.530, L.12.) That Video conﬁrms that Smith did not ask the question
she adamantly claimed she asked.

Even taken

(E State’s EX. 7

at face value, the story

example, Smith claimed that she did not

have a phone.”

(Tr.,

at 1:40-4:00.)

Smith told

at trial

call the police after the

was, frankly, absurd.

For

murder because she “didn’t

p.1643, Ls.6-12.) But she also testiﬁed that shortly after the murder,

With Davis’s body in her kitchen and brain matter 0n the walls, she drove Davis’s White

Grand PriX

into

p.1643, Ls.1-5.)

Blackfoot—not
She also

to get the

testiﬁed,

on

ofﬁcers into her house because she
correctly.”

4

police—but

to “get

milk” from Walmart.

(Tr.,

direct examination, that she did not let the police

‘Was afraid that they’d not handle the evidence

(TL, p.1625, Ls.10-25.) Especially in light 0f the overwhelming evidence of

2

The jail recordings are State’s Exhibits 247, 248, and 249, but the record is unclear as to
Which recording is Which exhibit. This quote is at 2:51-3:10 in the recording that is four
minutes long and titled 02_Smith_208-965-9234_03_05-17_1250.mp3.
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Smith’s

guilt,

no reasonable juror would believe Smith’s inconsistent testimony.

in the admission

Any error

0f the Leslies’ testimony was therefore harmless.

III.

The Admission Of State’s Exhibit 4 Did Not Rise T0 The Level Of Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction

The admission of
ofﬁcers and Smith

0f fundamental

at

her

State’s Exhibit 4,

home before

error. First,

Which showed the conversation between the

the initial warrantless entry, did not rise to the level

Smith has failed to show the Violation 0f a constitutional right

because she has not shown that the prosecutor introduced the Video for the purpose of

having the jury infer
the

guilt

from Smith’s refusal

more reasonable inference

is

t0 consent to a search

ofher house. Instead,

that the prosecutor introduced the Video for the relevant

and admissible statements Smith made other than her refusals

to consent t0 a search.

Second, Smith failed to show that her counsel’s failure t0 object was not

tactical.

The only evidence

in the record

excluded

But Smith’s counsel did not try t0 exclude the exhibit entirely; he simply

entirely.

tried t0 force the state t0 call

advantageous to his

Smith points

keep the exhibit

Lopez before playing the Video because he saw

that as

client.

Third, Smith has failed to

Video actually affected the verdict.
at trial, to

t0 is her counsel’s attempt to

show

that Smith’s refusals to consent t0 a search

0n the

Any error was harmless because another Video admitted

Which Smith did not object

in the district court or

0n appeal, showed the same

conversation and the state presented overwhelming evidence of Smith’s
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guilt.

Standard

B.

Of Review

Smith concedes
that

it

that she did not object to the

violated the Fourth

admission 0f the Video on the basis

Amendment. (Appellant’s

was not followed by a contemporaneous

objection,

it

brief, p.22.)

shall only be

“If [an] alleged error

reviewed by an appellate

court under Idaho’s fundamental error doctrine.” State V. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245

P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

Smith Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In Admitting State’s Exhibit 4

C.

The

district court

commit fundamental

did not

error

by admitting

the Video 0f the

ofﬁcers searching Smith’s home. Fundamental error review requires Smith t0

any error in the admission ofthe Video

and

cannot

make any 0f these showings.

(3)

First,

was not harmless.

Smith has failed

to

that

(1) clearly violated a constitutional right; (2) plainly

E m,

exists,

show

150 Idaho

show admitting

at

228, 245 P.3d at 980.

Smith

the Video clearly violated a constitutional

right.

“The same

rationale that precludes evidence of an accused’s assertion of his or her

Fifth

Amendment

Rights offeredfor the purpose either ofimpeachmem‘ 0r inferring guilt

precludes evidence 0f the accused’s assertion of his or her Fourth

oﬂeredfor the samepurposes.” State

V. Christiansen,

Amendment

rights

144 Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175,

1182 (2007) (emphases added) (ﬁnding constitutional Violation where “the prosecuting
attorney’s sole purpose for eliciting this testimony

Christiansen’s refusal to consent to the search

Leske, 164

was

to

have the jury infer that

showed consciousness of guilt”);

ﬂm

Idaho 862, 868, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019) (assuming constitutional Violation

Where defendant’s

refusal to submit t0 blood

draw was introduced

0f guilt).
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to

show consciousness

show

the jury Smith’s

impeachment or

inferring guilt.”

Here, unlike in Christiansen 0r Jeske, the prosecutor did not
refusal t0 consent t0 a search “for the purpose either of

Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 470, 163 P.3d at 1182. In the Video, Smith’s refusals to consent

to a search are interspersed in a relevant

(E State’s EX.
came

4.)

For example,

t0 “see if everything’s

at the

house.

tells

Day

the ofﬁcers that

4

(State’s EX.

amendment precluded

beginning 0f the Video, an ofﬁcer

(State’s EX.

4

at 0:00-0: 12.)

Later in the conversation,

Day and Davis

shot Davis in the legs and both

at 2:35-5:10.)

Neither the Fourth

the Video to the jury, the prosecutor did not ask the witness

Amendment rights.

(TL, p.5 1 8, L.2

left

Amendment nor any

the admission of those statements. Furthermore,

invocation of her Fourth

Smith they

tells

okay” and—despite having Davis’s dead body in her house—

Smith responds “everything’s ﬁne.”
Smith

and admissible conversation with the ofﬁcers.

when

her

other

introducing

any questions about Smith’s

— p.524,

L.16.)

Second, Smith has failed t0 point t0 any evidence in the record showing that the
alleged error plainly exists.

2019) (holding second

E

PC_rry

State V. Miller,

No. 465 17,

prong requires defendant

evidence as to whether 0r not

trial

counsel

made

to

But

on

citation omitted).)

at 3

(holding that appellant counsel’s contention that

was not

Smith argues
basis 0f foundation.

that is insufﬁcient

tactical” insufﬁcient to

is

15,

nothing t0 indicate that defense

its

face.

show

E m,

“it is clear

(internal quotes

No. 46517,

slip op.

from the record

that the

plain error).

that her trial counsel tried to exclude the Video

by objecting on

(Appellant’s brief, p.25.) She misreads the record.
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March

that the record “contain[s]

was a tactical decision.” (Appellant’s brief, p.25

and

failure t0 object

show

(Idaho

a tactical decision in failing to object”).

Smith offers her appellate counsel’s opinion that “[t]here
counsel’s failure t0 obj ect

slip op. at 3

the

Her counsel did

not try to have the Video excluded entirely; he simply

made

a “conditional” objection as to

foundation because he wanted the state t0 call Lopez as a witness before introducing the
Video. (TL, p.492, Ls.5-25.) Smith’s counsel

wanted Lopez

t0 testify ﬁrst because, in his

View, “the police ofﬁcers [were] exaggerating” what Lopez told them
told

Smith

that

when

the ofﬁcers

“[W]e have information out here that someone needs medical assistance.”

(TL, p.492, Ls.1 1- 1 6.) Smith’s counsel could have

helped more than hurt because, in his View,

it

made the tactical decision that the Video

showed

the ofﬁcers stretching the truth in

their investigation.

Third, Smith has failed to

third

prong of Perry requires

record

.

.

.

show

that the alleged error

that the defendant demonstrate that the clear error in the

actually affected the

outcome of the

op. at 4 (emphasis added). In fact, the record

did not affect the outcome of the

Video was harmless because

Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho

P.2d

at 123-24.

pp.22-29).

it

trial

was

its

trial

shows

m,

proceedings.”

that

any error

No. 465 17,

slip

in introducing the Video

proceedings. Speciﬁcally, any error in admitting the
duplicative of other evidence admitted at

E

trial.

912, 71 P.3d at 1059; Leliefeld, 104 Idaho at 369-70, 659

State’s Exhibit 7

and Smith did not obj ect
not challenged

at

was not harmless. “[T]he

t0 the

showed

the

same conversation from a

admission of State’s Exhibit 7 in the

different angle,

district court

and has

admission 0n appeal (TL, p.528, L.24 — p.529, L.4; Appellant’s

brief,

Furthermore, the only damaging inference the jury could draw from Smith

refusing to consent t0 a search 0f her house

was

that

Smith was trying to hide the body,

and the jury heard plenty of other evidence

that

Smith was trying

t0 hide the body.

For

when they

ﬁrst

example, and as explained above, Smith afﬁrmatively lied t0 the police
appeared 0n her doorstep.

And

Lopez, Black, and Gonzalez
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all

testiﬁed that Smith asked

for help “to get rid of the body.” (TL, p.1541, Ls.7-10; see Tr., p.13 17, Ls.10-25, p.1372,

L22 —
state

Any

p.1373, L.4.)

proved Smith

error in the Video’s admission

tried to hide the

was thus harmless because

the

body “through a signiﬁcant body of unobjectionable

testimony.” State V. Carmouche, 155 Idaho 831, 840, 317 P.3d 728, 737 (Ct. App. 2013)

(ﬁnding testimony that defendant refused consent t0 search harmless because “[t]he

improper evidence that Carmouche declined t0 allow the ofﬁcer t0 enter his

one 0f many points 0f testimony

elicited

by

the [s]tate to

show

that

home was

but

he did not want the

police t0 see or speak With the Victim”).

The Video was
state

also harmless because, as explained above,

presented overwhelming evidence of Smith’s

436 P.3d
Fourth

Idaho

at

E m,

Part II.C., the

164 Idaho

at

868-69,

689-90 (ﬁnding error in admitting Video recording of defendant invoking

Amendment
at

guilt.

ﬂ s_uw

rights harmless

due

t0

overwhelming evidence); Christiansen, 144

471, 163 P.3d at 1183 (ﬁnding error in prosecutor eliciting testimony that

defendant reﬁJsed t0 consent harmless because the evidence 0f defendant’s guilt was
“clear—cut”).

Smith argues

that the record

shows the alleged

error actually affected the verdict

because the jurors asked to review the Video during deliberations.

That might be a reasonable inference

pp.26-27.)

invoking her Fourth

if the

(Appellant’s brief,

Video only contained Smith

Amendment rights. But Smith invoking her Fourth Amendment rights

makes up only a small

part of the ﬁfteen-minute Video.

(E, gg,

4

at

0:00-

0:12 (showing Smith telling the ofﬁcers that “everything’s ﬁne”); State’s EX. 4

at

2:35-

5:10 (showing Smith telling ofﬁcers that
State’s EX.

4

at

Day

shot Davis and both

7:50-9:40 (showing ofﬁcers talking t0
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State’s EX.

men

left

her house);

Duke Without Smith present);

State’s

EX. 4 at 9:40-15:18 (showing ofﬁcers conducting a protective sweep and securing the
premises).)

And

in the request, the jury described the Video as “the lst Video

of the cops

clearing the house” (R., p.465 (emphasis added)), Which description suggests the jury
actually interested in the part of the Video

showing the ofﬁcers securing the house rather

than the part of the Video showing the conversation With Smith,
statements invoking her Fourth

Smith also argues
credibility.

that

But the mere

let

alone Smith’s few

Amendment rights.

Smith invoking her Fourth Amendment rights went to her

fact that

Smith invoked her Fourth Amendment

hide a dead body, says nothing about Smith’s credibility.

m

rights,

9,

20 1 9) (deﬁning

credibility as “the quality or power

to support her credibility

278

.

.

.

.

.

.

(Ct.

that

App. 201

1),

argument by

of inspiring

(last

belief’).

even to

Merriam-

Credibility,

Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/credibilitv
July

was

Visited

Smith tries

citing State V. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635,

262 P.3d

for the proposition that “the Idaho Court of Appeals has actually held

commenting 0n the defendant’s

refusal t0 consent t0 a search

is

an important fact

because the jurors Will consider such evidence When assessing the defendant’s

credibility.” (Appellant’s brief, p.27.)

That

refusal of consent affecting credibility.

ﬂ

is incorrect.

The court

.

.

.

said nothing about the

Betancourt, 15 1 Idaho at 639-41, 262 P.3d at

282-84.
In fact, Betancourt

verdict.

shows why the alleged

error here could not

In Betancourt, an ofﬁcer stopped the driver of a car

concealed weapon With a permit. 151 Idaho

at

Who

have affected the

admitted t0 carrying a

636, 262 P.3d at 279.

The ofﬁcer asked

for

permission to retrieve the weapon, and the driver declined. Li. The ofﬁcer arrested the
driver

0n suspicion 0f driving under the inﬂuence, and a search of the vehicle produced

32

methamphetamine.

showed

Li.

At

showed a bodycam Video from

the state

trial,

the ofﬁcer that

the driver’s refusal t0 consent to a search 0f the car and argued that

consciousness 0f guilt.

I_d.

at

639, 262 P.3d at 282.

harmless because “[t]he pivotal issue in

methamphetamine” and “the

this case

state’s strongest

The court held

was

it

showed

the error could not be

[the driver]’s

knowledge 0f the

evidence of [the driver] ’s knowledge was his

refusal to allow the ofﬁcer to search the vehicle.” Li. at 641,

262 P.3d

at

284.

Here, unlike in Betancourt where the pivotal issue was the driver’s knowledge of
the

methamphetamine, Smith’s knowledge of Davis’s body was not a contested issue

the case.

Tr.,

Smith confessed

to the jury that she

p.1642, Ls.17-21), that she did not report

that she tried t0 clean

up the evidence

(R.,

knew
it

in

Davis’s body was in her house (gg,

t0 the police (R., p.1648, Ls.22-25),

p.1663, Ls.20-25).

And

and

t0 the extent the jury

could infer Smith’s guilt from her refusal to consent, her refusal to consent was far from
“the state’s strongest evidence.”

Betancourt, 151 Idaho at 641, 262 P.3d at 284.

explained above, the state presented numerous Witnesses
killing

Davis before the murder and even more Witnesses

killing

Davis

after the

murder.

Who

As

testiﬁed Smith talked about

Who testiﬁed Smith

confessed to

In light 0f that evidence, Smith’s refusal to consent to a

search 0f her house could not have affected the verdict.

IV.

The Prosecutor’s Comments Did Not Rise To The Level Of Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction

The prosecutor’s alleged comment 0n Smith’s

home

refusal t0 consent t0 a search 0f her

did not rise to the level 0f fundamental error. First, Smith failed to

0f a constitutional right because the prosecutor made the comments only

show

a Violation

after

Smith gave

an innocent explanation for refusing t0 consent t0 the search in her direct examination.

33

Second, Smith failed to show that her counsel’s failure to object was not tactical because
she offered only her appellate counsel’s opinion that

Smith

failed to

show

been limited to Smith’s

when

lies to

B.

And

commented 0n her refusal

to

the ofﬁcers.

Third, Smith failed to

make and

show

the prosecutor’s

comments were only a small part 0f the

the state presented overwhelming evidence 0f

guilt.

Standard

Of Review

Smith concedes

that she did not object to the prosecutor’s closing argument.

(Appellant’s brief, p.22.)

obj ection,

it

shall

“If [an] alleged error

was not followed by a contemporaneous

only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s ﬁmdamental error

doctrine.” State V. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228,

C.

tactical.

read in context, the prosecutor’s argument could have

actually affected the verdict because the

point the prosecutor tried to

Smith’s

could not have been

that the prosecutor clearly 0r obviously

consent t0 a search because,

comments

it

245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

Smith Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Comments

The prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct amounting t0 fundamental
error in his closing argument. “[I]n reviewing allegations ofprosecutorial misconduct, this

Court ‘must keep in mind the

realities

0f trial.” State

P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018) (quoting State
(2007)).

V. Field,

Alwin, 164 Idaho 160,

_, 426

144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285

Closing arguments “are seldom careﬁllly constructed in toto before the event;

improvisation frequently results in syntax
clear.”

V.

Donnellv

V.

imperfect and meaning less than crystal

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). “[A] court should not

lightly infer that a prosecutor intends

meaning or

left

an ambiguous remark t0 have

that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will

34

draw

its

most damaging

that

meaning from

the plethora 0f less

m,

trial.”

damaging

164 Idaho

“Where

interpretations.”

may

“A

at 979.

not necessarily a perfect

misconduct was not objected

only order a reversal

when

to at trial, Idaho

the defendant demonstrates that the

Violation in question qualiﬁes as fundamental error

P.3d

fair trial is

_, 426 P.3d at 1269.

at

[alleged] prosecutorial

appellate courts

I_d.

.”
.

.

.

Pe_rry,

150 Idaho

at

227, 245

Fundamental error “review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the

defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1)
violates

one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional

(without the need for any additional

a tactical decision); and (3)
satisfy her

.

.

.

rights; (2) plainly exists

information as t0 Whether the failure t0 obj ect was

was not harmless.” Li

at

228, 245 P.3d at 980. Smith cannot

burden 0n any prong.

First, the

prosecutor’s

comments did not

Violate an

unwaived

constitutional right.

A prosecutor “commenting on a defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right is improper.”

m,

164 Idaho

at

868, 436 P.3d at 689. But “such comments must be evaluated in light

ofdefense conduct and in the context offhe entire

402 P.3d 1073, 1087 (2017) (emphasis
stated in closing

“didn’t

those

trial.” State V. Folk,

in original).

For example, in

argument that the defendant “didn’t want

want an attorney asking him questions.”

comments on

the defendant’s Fifth

I_d.

t0

162 Idaho 620, 634,

Mg

be cross—examined” and

But the Idaho Supreme Court found

Amendment right to remain

the level of fundamental error because “the prosecutor’s

silent did not rise to

comments were made

t0 [the defendant]’s assertion that taking the stand allows a prosecutor to

people 100k guilty.” Li.

at

635, 402 P.3d at 1088.
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the prosecutor

in response

make

innocent

The lesson from

m

is that, at least

constitutional right as both a shield

1087-88. That
right, the

is,

if the

ﬂQ

Applying the lesson from
level of fundamental error.

as to

Why

and a sword.

E

162 Idaho

at

634-35, 402 P.3d at

defendant explains t0 the jury Why she exercised her constitutional

prosecutor can respond

exercised her right.

in this context, a defendant cannot use a

by explaining

m

here, the prosecutor’s

During Smith’s

she invoked her Fourth

the state’s

View of why the defendant

comments did not

direct examination, she offered

Amendment

rise to the

an explanation

right t0 refuse consent t0 a search

of her

home:

And we’ve

Q. Okay.
doorstep?

seen a Video of the police showing up on your

A. Yes.
Q.

And

so

Why not just let them in and let them walk around?

A. Because

I

was

0n everything, and

And

then

stomp

afraid that they’d not handle the evidence correctly,
tear everything up.

we had some

concerns about

my mom’s weed

pipes and

some

drug paraphernalia. Yeah.
(TL, p. 1 625, Ls.7- 1 6.)

Once Smith offered an innocent explanation for invoking her Fourth

Amendment right, the prosecutor could respond by explaining, from the state

E

Why Smith may have

invoked her

88. Ifthe prosecutor

commented 0n Smith’s

right.

Fo_lk,

162 Idaho

rights,

at

’

s

perspective,

634-35, 402 P.3d at 1087-

he did so only

after

Smith offered an

innocent explanation for refusing consent. Because the prosecutor’s comments could have

been a response
fundamental

t0 Smith’s testimony, those

error.

E m,

comments 0n defendant’s

Fifth

162 Idaho

at

comments could not

rise t0 the level

of

635, 402 P.3d at 1088 (ﬁnding prosecutor’s

Amendment right
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to stay silent did not rise to the level

0f

fundamental error because “we are unable to conclude that they were not made in response
t0 Folk’s explanation for not taking the stand”).

Second, Smith has failed to point to any evidence in the record showing that the
alleged error plainly exists. “The second prong of PeJrr

.

.

.

states ‘the error

must be

clear

0r obvious, Without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to Whether the failure t0 object

m,
again,

No. 46517,

slip op. at 3

defense counsel’s failure to object was a tactical decision.”

m,

and

No. 46517,

from the record

it is

decision.”

is

is

nothing t0 indicate that

(Appellant’s brief, p.25

insufﬁcient on

its

(holding that appellant counsel’s contention that

that the failure to obj ect

Furthermore,

But, again, that

citation omitted).)

slip op. at 3

tactical

(quoting PeJrr, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978). Here,

Smith offers her appellate counsel’s opinion that “[t]here

(internal quotes

was a

was not

tactical” insufﬁcient to

m,

No. 46517,

slip op. at 3.

The prosecutor

West
them that Kevin had shot David
Davis in the legs and that he had left. N0 one was hurt there. N0 body was
there. Nothing had happened inside the residence. They just needed to
law enforcement arrived

Pingree, Idaho,

at

her residence, at 631 South 1600

Bingham County, she

told

leave and g0 about their business.

them to do, because she had something to hide. She
preferred that that’s What they would d0, because she had something to hide.
That’s what she wanted

She had the body 0f David Davis to hide, the body of David Davis that she
had continually since she shot him in the back 0f the head, trying t0 ﬁgure
out how she was going to get rid 0f it. And she had continually tried t0
ﬁgure out how she was going t0 accomplish that.
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error).

commented on

stated:

When

E

“it is clear

show plain

not “clear or obvious” that the prosecutor actually

Smith’s refusal t0 consent t0 a search.

face.

The prosecutor

(TL, p.1722, Ls.1-16.)

clearly

made

the point that Smith tried to hide

Davis’s body. Yet he did so not by telling the jury that Smith refused t0 consent t0 a search

of her home but by emphasizing the

and go about
Smith

was

lied

their business.”

when

there,”

and

Smith told the ofﬁcers

lies

that “[n]othing

the police because neither the Fourth

(Ct.

App.

lie to

the police.

“[n]0 one

was

hurt,” that “[n]o

body

happened inside the residence.” (TL, p.1722, Ls.1-16.)

The prosecutor could permissibly argue

the right t0

left,” that

encourage them “t0 leave

Speciﬁcally, he emphasized that

(TL, p.1722, Ls.1-16.)

she said that “[Davis] had

t0

that

tried to hide Davis’s

Amendment nor any

other

Brown, 131 Idaho 61,

State V.

C_f.

Smith

body by lying

to

amendment gave Smith

70, 951 P.2d 1288, 1297

1998) (ﬁnding n0 prosecutorial misconduct where “the prosecutor was

commenting upon recorded statements

show

Third, Smith has failed to

outcome of the

trial

proceedings.”

comment 0n Smith’s

that

that the alleged

m,

to the police about

because, as explained above,

guilt.

to

an investigating ofﬁcer”).

misconduct “actually affected the

slip op. at

Amendment

make, Which was

what had happened.

Furthermore, the prosecutor’s

evidence of Smith’s

N0. 46517,

invocation of her Fourth

in the overall point the prosecutor tried to

body by lying

Brown gave

right played only a

that

(E

4 (emphasis added).

Tr.,

E m,

p.1722, Ls.1-16.)
affected the verdict

Part II.C., the state presented

164 Idaho

at

role

Smith tried t0 hide Davis’s

comment could not have

ﬂ s_uw

minor

Any

overwhelming

868-69, 436 P.3d

at

689-90;

Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 471, 163 P.3d at 1183.

V.

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply
Smith has failed

t0

show

the cumulative error doctrine applies.

predicate t0 the application 0f the [cumulative error] doctrine
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is

“[A] necessary

a ﬁnding of more than one

error.” State V. Per_ry,

150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008). Thus, the cumulative

error doctrine cannot apply because

Even

if

Smith has

failed t0

Smith had shown two or more

show two

errors, the

or

more

errors.

cumulative error doctrine does

not require reversal because the state presented overwhelming evidence 0f Smith’s

E

s_um

Part II.C.;

ﬂ alﬂ

guilt.

State V. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct.

App. 2000) (holding multiple errors harmless because “there [was] overwhelming evidence
of Barcella’s

guilt”).

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment entered after a jury

found Smith guilty of ﬁrst-degree murder and destruction of evidence.

DATED this

12th day 0f July, 2019.
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Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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